This paper studies equilibrium selection in binary supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. We provide complete characterizations of absorbing and globally accessible equilibria and apply them to two subclasses of games. First, for unanimity games, it is shown that our selection criterion is not in agreement with that in terms of Nash products, and an example is presented in which two strict Nash equilibria are simultaneously globally accessible when the friction is sufficiently small. Second, a class of games with invariant diagonal are proposed and shown to generically admit an absorbing and globally accessible equilibrium for small frictions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.
Introduction
In this paper we study N -player bipolar games (Selten (1995) ), where each player has binary actions 0 and 1, and the profiles 0 ("all 0") and 1 ("all 1") are strict Nash equilibria. We also assume a certain monotonicity condition of the incentive functions which is equivalent to the game being supermodular. Such games form a simple and natural class of coordination games for which the problem of equilibrium selection arises.
The simplest games in this class are the N -player unanimity games (Harsanyi and Selten (1988) ). These are games where the payoffs are zero except in two cases: when all players play action 0, payoffs are y i > 0; when all players play action 1, payoffs are z i > 0. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) suggest that the higher Nash product, i.e., N i=1 y i ≶ N i=1 z i , should determine which of the two strict equilibria is selected. For N = 2 players this is equivalent to the well-known and well-understood risk-dominance concept, for which Harsanyi and Selten (1988) provide a convincing axiomatic characterization, while Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) offer approaches based on forward-looking behavior and payoff uncertainty, respectively, that select a risk-dominant equilibrium. However, for N ≥ 3 an axiomatic approach is lacking and the only evolutionary justification so far is a spatio-temporal model by Hofbauer (1999) . 1 A second subclass are symmetric N -player binary supermodular games. A prominent example is the N -player stag hunt game studied by Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) using their method of global games. Kim (1996) compares several equilibrium selection approaches for this class of games. These games are known to be potential games (Monderer and Shapley (1996) ; see, e.g., Blume (2003) , Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) , Morris (1999) ). Hofbauer and Sorger (1999, 2002) and Ui (2001) show that the potential maximizer agrees with the equilibrium selected by perfect foresight dynamics and robustness to incomplete information, respectively. 2 Blume (2003) and Maruta (2002) study stochastic evolutionary models for these games. The crucial property of these games is the invariance of the diagonal of the state space (i.e., the set of all mixed strategies) due to the symmetry. In Section 5 we propose and study the class of binary supermodular games with an invariant diagonal, in which all players receive the same payoffs when they all play the same mixed strategy. These games generalize the symmetric binary supermodular games.
A third subclass was considered by Selten (1995) , namely bipolar games with linear incentives, where the payoff differences between two actions can be expressed as linear functions of mixed strategy profiles. These games were analyzed further in Hofbauer (1999) for spatial games and in Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) for perfect foresight dynamics. Takahashi (2008) provides a unified treatment for N -player many-action games with linear incentives. The present paper concentrates on games with nonlinear incentives which naturally arise for N ≥ 3 player normal form games.
The equilibrium selection approach we employ in this paper is that of perfect foresight dynamics due to Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) ; see also Hofbauer and Sorger (1999, 2002) , Oyama (2002) , Oyama et al. (2008, OTH henceforth), and Takahashi (2008) . 3 An N -player normal form game is played repeatedly in a random-matching fashion in a large society of N continua of agents (one for each player role of the game). Opportunities at which agents can revise their actions arrive according to independent Poisson processes, which along with time discounting constitutes the friction of the model. Each agent, given a revision opportunity, takes a best response to the future course of play in the society. This forward-looking behavior of agents has an effect to destabilize some strict Nash equilibria when the degree of friction is small. A Nash equilibrium a * is globally accessible if for any initial action distribution, there exists an equilibrium path that converges to a * ; a * is linearly absorbing if the path linearly converges to a * is the unique equilibrium path from each initial action distribution in a neighborhood of a * . If an equilibrium that is globally accessible (linearly absorbing, resp.) is also linearly absorbing (globally accessible, resp.), then it is a unique such equilibrium.
In Section 3, for arbitrary binary supermodular games we obtain complete characterizations for linear absorption and for global accessibility of a strict Nash equilibrium. These characterizations are applied to two subclasses in Sections 4 and 5. First, for unanimity games, we show that our selection criterion is not in agreement with that in terms of Nash products. In fact, the perfect foresight dynamics fails to select a single Nash equilibrium for some unanimity games. A nondegenerate example (Example 4.1) demonstrates that the two strict Nash equilibria are mutually accessible, actually globally accessible, for a small friction.
Second, for games with invariant diagonal, we obtain the generic existence of a linearly absorbing and globally accessible equilibrium for a small friction. This equilibrium maximizes the potential along the diagonal. In general the potential does not extend to the whole state space; in fact we provide a simple example for this (Example 5.1). Nevertheless, because of the supermodularity, the maximizer of the potential along the diagonal turns out to have the stability properties, as if the potential extended to the whole state space.
In OTH (2008) we analyzed N -player many-action supermodular games with monotone potentials and showed that the monotone potential maximizer is globally accessible and linearly absorbing for small frictions. Furthermore, the monotone potential maximizer is also known to be robust to incomplete information (Morris and Ui (2005) ). However, it need not always exist, and in fact, the results obtained in OTH (2008) invoking monotone potentials do not cover the two subclasses studied in the present paper. This will be illustrated in Examples 4.1 and 5.1 mentioned above.
Preliminaries

Binary Supermodular Games
We consider an N ≥ 2 player binary game G = (I, A, (u i ) i∈I ), where I = {1, . . . , N } is the set of players, A = {0, 1} the action set for each player, and u i : A N → R the payoff function for player i ∈ I. Payoff functions u i (h, ·), h ∈ A, are extended to mixed strategy profiles x −i ∈ ∆(A) N −1 in the usual way:
We denote by p i ∈ [0, 1] the probability assigned by player i on action 1, and hence that assigned on action 0 is 1 − p i . The incentive function
We identify a = (a i ) i∈I ∈ A N with the vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p N ) ∈ [0, 1] N such that p i = 0 if a i = 0 and p i = 1 if a i = 1. We assume that action profiles 0, where all players play 0, and 1, where all players play 1, are strict Nash equilibria, i.e.,
for all i. We further assume that d i is nondecreasing in each p j (j = i) so that the game is supermodular. Thus, the game is a bipolar supermodular game (Selten (1995) ).
Perfect Foresight Dynamics
Given an N -player binary game as described above, which will be called the stage game, we consider the following dynamic societal game. Society consists of N large populations of infinitesimal agents, one for each role in the stage game. In each population, agents are identical and anonymous. At each point in time, one agent is selected randomly from each population and matched to form an N -tuple and play the stage game. Agents cannot switch actions at every point in time. Instead, every agent must make a commitment to a particular action for a random time interval. Time instants at which each agent can switch actions follow a Poisson process with the arrival rate λ > 0. The processes are independent across agents. We choose without loss of generality the unit of time in such a way that λ = 1. The action distribution in population i ∈ I at time t ∈ R + is denoted by
where φ i (t) (1−φ i (t), resp.) is the fraction of agents in population i who are committing to action 1 (action 0, resp.) at time t. The initial condition φ (0) is exogenously given. Due to the assumption that the switching times follow independent Poisson processes with arrival rate λ = 1, φ i (·) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1, which implies in particular that it is differentiable at almost all t ≥ 0. We call such a path φ(·) a feasible path.
Lipschitz continuous, and for almost all t ≥ 0 there exists
Denote by Φ the set of feasible paths, which is convex and compact in the topology of uniform convergence on compact intervals. In Equation (2.1), α i (t) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of the agents in population i who have a revision opportunity and choose action 1 during the short time interval [t, t+dt). In particular, if for some action profile a = (a i ) i∈I ∈ A N , α i (t) = a i for all i ∈ I and all t ≥ 0, then the resulting feasible path, which converges linearly to a, is called a linear path to a.
An agent in population i anticipates the future evolution of the action distribution, and, if given the opportunity to switch actions, commits to an action that maximizes his expected discounted payoff. Since the duration of the commitment has an exponential distribution with mean 1, the expected discounted payoff of committing to action h ∈ A at time t with a given anticipated path φ ∈ Φ is represented by
where θ > 0 is the common rate of time preference relative to λ = 1. We view the discounted average duration of a commitment, θ/λ = θ, as the degree of friction. Note that V is well-defined whenever θ > −1, and particularly for
Given a feasible path φ ∈ Φ, let B i (φ)(t) ⊂ [0, 1] be the set of best responses in mixed strategies to φ −i = (φ j ) j =i at time t, i.e.,
A perfect foresight path is an equilibrium path of the dynamic model, that is, a feasible path along which each agent optimizes against the correctly anticipated future path.
Definition 2.2. A feasible path φ is said to be a perfect foresight path from
.), then action 1 (action 0, resp.) is taken by some positive fraction of the agents in population i having a revision opportunity during the short time interval [t, t + dt). The definition says that such an action must be a best response to the path φ itself. It is known that a perfect foresight path exists for each initial condition (see OTH (2008, Subsection 2.3)).
Since 1 and 0 are Nash equilibria of the stage game, the constant paths φ andψ such thatφ(t) = 1 andψ(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 are perfect foresight paths. Nevertheless, there may exist another perfect foresight path from a Nash equilibrium which converges to a different Nash equilibrium. When the degree of friction θ > 0 is sufficiently small, this may happen even from a strict Nash equilibrium. In fact, in 2 × 2 coordination games, there exists a perfect foresight path from the risk-dominated equilibrium to the risk-dominant equilibrium for small θ > 0, but not vice versa (Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) ). Following Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) and OTH (2008), we employ the following stability concepts (B ε (a * ) denotes
Definition 2.3. (a) a * ∈ A N is absorbing if there exists ε > 0 such that any perfect foresight path from any p ∈ B ε (a * ) converges to a * .
(b) a * ∈ A N is linearly absorbing if there exists ε > 0 such that for any p ∈ B ε (a * ), the linear path to a * is a unique perfect foresight path from p.
(c) a * ∈ A N is accessible from p ∈ [0, 1] N if there exists a perfect foresight path from p that converges to a * . a * is globally accessible if it is accessible from any p.
Any absorbing or globally accessible state must be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game (OTH (2008, Proposition 2.1)). In supermodular games, absorption and linear absorption are equivalent (OTH (2008, Proposition 3.3)). We are interested in a (unique, by definition) Nash equilibrium that is linearly absorbing and globally accessible when the degree of friction θ > 0 is sufficiently small.
Supermodularity and Monotonicity
For p, q ∈ [0, 1] N , write p ≤ q if p i ≤ q i for all i = 1, . . . , N . Due to the supermodularity assumption on the stage game,
the perfect foresight dynamics has several nice monotonicity properties as demonstrated in OTH (2008), some of which will be used in the subsequent sections.
For φ, ψ ∈ Φ, define φ ψ by φ(t) ≤ ψ(t) for all t ≥ 0. The monotonicity of d i is immediately inherited by ∆V θ i . That is, it holds that if φ ψ, then
for all i ∈ I and all t ≥ 0. We say that a feasible path φ is a superpath if
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ≥ 0; a feasible path ψ is a subpath if
for all i ∈ I and almost all t ≥ 0 Note that φ is a perfect foresight path if and only if it is both a superpath and a subpath. We have the following. 
General Results
In this section, we give complete characterizations for the strict Nash equilibrium 1 to be globally accessible and to be absorbing (or, equivalently, linearly absorbing), respectively. By reversing the orders of actions, the results can be applied to the other Nash equilibrium 0. The subsequent sections then consider two subclasses of binary supermodular games.
For T = (T i ) i∈I ∈ R N + , let φ u T be the feasible path given by
which starts at 0 and converges to 1. Along φ u T , agents in population i ∈ I start choosing action 1 at time T i .
DenoteR
where S = {i ∈ I | T i = ∞}. Let 0 S be the action profile such that i chooses 0 if i ∈ S and 1 if i / ∈ S. Along ψ d T , which starts at 1 and converges to 0 S , agents in population i ∈ S start choosing action 0 at time T i , while those in population i / ∈ S always play action 1. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the state 1 to be globally accessible for a given degree of friction (Proposition 3.1) and for any small degree of friction (Proposition 3.2), respectively. Each condition is equivalent to the existence of a subpath of the form (3.1).
Proposition 3.1. Let θ > 0 be given. The strict Nash equilibrium 1 is globally accessible for θ if and only if there exists T = (T i ) i∈I ∈ R N + such that for all i ∈ I, ∆V
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3.2. There existsθ > 0 such that the strict Nash equilibrium 1 is globally accessible for all θ ∈ (0,θ) if and only if there exists T = (T i ) i∈I ∈ R N + such that for all i ∈ I,
Next, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the state 1 to be absorbing for a given degree of friction (Proposition 3.3) and for any degree of friction (Proposition 3.4), respectively. Each condition is equivalent to the nonexistence of a superpath of the form (3.2)-(3.3) with 0 S being a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Proposition 3.3. Let θ > 0 be given. The strict Nash equilibrium 1 is absorbing for θ if and only if for any T = (T i ) i∈I ∈R N + such that S = {i ∈ I | T i = ∞} is nonempty and 0 S is a Nash equilibrium, there exists i ∈ S such that ∆V
Proposition 3.4. The strict Nash equilibrium 1 is absorbing for all θ > 0 if and only if for any T = (T i ) i∈I ∈R N + such that S = {i ∈ I | T i = ∞} is nonempty and 0 S is a Nash equilibrium, there exists i ∈ S such that
Unanimity Games
This section considers N -player unanimity games. The stage game is given by
where y i , z i > 0. The incentive function for player i is then given by
Note that this game is supermodular.
For T = (T i ) i∈I ∈ R N + , let
and
Global Accessibility
For a feasible path φ u T defined by (3.1) with a given T = (T i ) i∈I ∈ R N + , the discounted payoff difference is given by
. We immediately have the following from Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that the stage game is a unanimity game given by (4.1). Then there existsθ > 0 such that 1 is globally accessible for all θ ∈ (0,θ) if and only if there exists T ∈ R N + such that for all i ∈ I,
Symmetrically, there existsθ > 0 such that 0 is globally accessible for all θ ∈ (0,θ) if and only if there exists T ∈ R N + such that for all i ∈ I,
Absorption
For a feasible path ψ d T defined by (3.2) with a given T = (T i ) i∈I ∈ R N + , the discounted payoff difference is given by
. We have the following from Proposition 3.4. Observe that in this case, S satisfies the condition in Proposition 3.4 only if S = I. Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the stage game is a unanimity game given by (4.1). Then 1 is absorbing for all θ > 0 if and only if for any T ∈ R N + , there exists i ∈ I such that
Symmetrically, 0 is absorbing for all θ > 0 if and only if for any T ∈ R N + , there exists i ∈ I such that
Remark 4.1. Kojima and Takahashi (2008, Lemma 1) observe that i∈I (ρ i (T)/π i (T)) ≥ N for all T ∈ R N + . By Proposition 4.2 above, it follows that if i∈I (y i /z i ) ≤ N , then 1 is absorbing for all θ > 0 (Kojima and Takahashi (2008, Proposition 4) ). Note that this sufficient condition, i∈I (y i /z i ) ≤ N , implies the condition that the Nash product of 1, i∈I z i , is larger than or equal to that of 0, i∈I y i (by the arithmetic meangeometric mean inequality). Similarly, by Proposition 4.1, it follows that for 1 to be globally accessible for small enough θ > 0, it is necessary that i∈I (z i /y i ) > N . This necessary condition is implied by the condition that the Nash product of 1 is larger than that of 0.
Two-Player Case
In the case where N = 2, there exists T ∈ R 2 + such that
if and only if z 1 z 2 > y 1 y 2 . Therefore, by Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, 1 is absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree of friction if and only if 1 has the higher Nash product over 0. In the two-player case, this is equivalent to that 1 risk-dominates 0.
Three-Player Case
When N ≥ 3, the complete characterizations given in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 turn out to be rather complex. Here we consider three-player binary games with a symmetry between players 2 and 3. We demonstrate that even for this simple class of games, both Nash equilibria 1 and 0 may be simultaneously globally accessible states when the friction is small. Specifically, we consider the case where
We can exploit the symmetry due to the following fact. Note here that if
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that the stage game is given by (4.1). Then 1 is globally accessible for any small degree of friction if and only if there exists T such that for all i ∈ I,
Proof. It suffices to show that if there exists T that satisfies (4.5), then there exists T that satisfies both (4.5) and (4.6). Take T that satisfies (4.5) and define T by
Here we fix any i. By definition, there exists j such that T i = T j and z j /y j ≤ z i /y i . Take such a j. Note that T −j ≥ T −j and T j = T j . Since T satisfies (4.5), π j is decreasing in T −j , and ρ j is increasing in T −j , we have
On the other hand, π i (T ) = π j (T ) and ρ i (T ) = ρ j (T ) since T i = T j . Therefore, it follows from z j /y j ≤ z i /y i that
which completes the proof.
A direct computation utilizing Lemma 4.3 shows that 1 is globally accessible for a small friction if and only if there exists u ≥ 1 such that
The above condition is equivalent to that r < s and r > 2 (s − 1) √ 9s 2 − 12s + 12 + 3s 2 − 5s + 4 , or r ≥ s and r > 2 s − 1.
In the game given by (4.4), 1 has the higher Nash product over 0 if rs 2 > 1. A direct comparison between r > 1/s 2 and the above expressions gives the following sufficient condition in terms of Nash product.
Proposition 4.4. In the three-player unanimity game given by (4.4), the Nash equilibrium with the higher Nash product is globally accessible for any small degree of friction.
The converse is not true.
Example 4.1. Let y 1 = 6 + c > 0, y 2 = y 3 = 1, and z 1 = z 2 = z 3 = 2 (see Figure 1) . This game is a modified version of an example in Morris and Ui (2005, Example 1). 4 If c > 0, then 0 is globally accessible for a small friction, while if c < 2 √ 6, then 1 is globally accessible for a small friction. Therefore, if 0 < c < 2 √ 6, the game has two globally accessible states simultaneously when the friction is small. Note that 0 (1, resp.) has the higher Nash product if c > 2 (c < 2, resp.).
On the other hand, one can show that if c ≤ 0, then 1 is absorbing for any degree of friction, while if c ≥ 2 √ 6, then 0 is absorbing for any degree of friction. 
Binary Games with Invariant Diagonal
This section considers N -player binary supermodular games with invariant diagonal. A binary game is said to have an invariant diagonal if the incentive functions satisfy
for all ξ ∈ [0, 1]. This class of games includes games with "equistable biforms" introduced in Selten (1995) . We maintain the assumption that d i is nondecreasing in each p j (j = i) so that the game is supermodular. Denote by D(ξ) the restriction of any d i to the diagonal ξ = p 1 = · · · = p N . Observe that D(ξ) is nondecreasing in ξ. This game has a potential function along the diagonal, which is defined by Proof. (a) Along the linear path φ from 0 to 1, which is given by φ i1 (t) = 1 − e −t for all i ∈ I,
Hence, if v(1) > v(0) = 0, then ∆V 0 i (φ)(0) > 0, implying that 1 is globally accessible for any small θ > 0 by Proposition 3.2. Note that φ i (t) ≥ ξ 0 e −t . Then,
where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of d i , and the second inequality follows from the stochastic dominance relation between the distributions on [0, ∞) with the density functions (1 + θ)e −(1+θ)s and e −s . Hence, we have φ i (t) = 1 − (1 − φ i (0))e −t for all t ≥ 0, and therefore, φ converges to 1, implying that 1 is absorbing (independently of θ > 0).
Similarly, if v(0) > v(1), then 0 is globally accessible for any small θ > 0 and absorbing for any θ > 0. Therefore, for generic binary supermodular games with invariant diagonal, either 0 or 1 is a unique absorbing and globally accessible state for any small degree of friction (even though there may be other strict equilibria).
Remark 5.1. A state x * ∈ i ∆(A i ) is linearly stable if for any x ∈ i ∆(A i ), the linear path from x to x * is a perfect foresight path. One can verify that for binary supermodular games with invariant diagonal, if v(1) > v(0), then 1 is linearly stable for any small degree of friction θ > 0.
Remark 5.2. The result here does not follow from Remark 1A in Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) , since we work with a multi-population setting with the state space [0, 1] N and allow for asymmetric paths out of the diagonal of [0, 1] N , which in principle must be taken into account for stability considerations. It is thanks to the diagonal invariance (5.1) that it suffices to consider only symmetric paths in (5.2). with density function (1 + θ)e −(1+θ)(s−t) strictly stochastically dominates the one with density function (1 + θ )e −(1+θ )(s−t) for 0 ≤ θ < θ . The statements follow from the facts that d i ((φ u T ) 1 (s)) is nondecreasing in s ≥ 0 and increasing in s ≥ max j∈I T j , and that
We first prove the global accessibility results.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. "If" part: Suppose that there exists T = (T i ) i∈I such that for all i, ∆V
holds for all i ∈ I and all t ≥ T i . By the definition of φ u T , this implies that φ u T is a subpath. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that for any x ∈ i ∆(A i ), there exists a perfect foresight path φ * from x such that φ u T φ * . Since φ u T converges to 1, φ * also converges to 1. Therefore, 1 is globally accessible.
"Only if" part: Suppose that 1 is globally accessible, so that there exists a perfect foresight path φ such that φ(0) = 0 and lim t→∞ φ(t) = 1. Take such a perfect foresight path φ and let
Proof of Proposition 3.2. "If" part: Take a T = (T i ) i∈I ∈ R N + such that
for all i ∈ I. Since ∆V θ i (φ u T )(T i ) is continuous in θ, there existsθ > 0 such that for all θ ∈ (0,θ), ∆V θ i (φ u T )(T i ) > 0 for all i ∈ I, implying that 1 is globally accessible for all θ ∈ (0,θ) by Proposition 3.1.
"Only if" part: Suppose that 1 is globally accessible for a small θ > 0. Then, by Proposition 3.1 there exists T such that Next we prove the absorption results. For Proposition 3.3, we show the following lemma. (While this lemma is a special case of Proposition 3 in Takahashi (2008) , we provide its proof for completeness.) Lemma A.3. Let θ > 0 be given. The state 1 is absorbing for θ if and only if for any T = (T i ) i∈I ∈R N + such that S = {i ∈ I | T i = ∞} is nonempty, there exists i ∈ S such that
Proof. "If" part: Note first that by the uniform continuity of d i , for each positive integer m, there exists ε m > 0 such that for any p = (p j ) j∈I , q = (q j ) j∈I ∈ [0, 1] N with p j ≥ q j − ε m for all j ∈ I, we have
for all i ∈ I. Then, for any feasible paths φ and ψ such that φ j1 (t) ≥ ψ j1 (t) − ε m for all j ∈ I and t ≥ 0, we have (a) 1 is absorbing for all θ > 0;
(b) there existsθ such that 1 is absorbing for all θ ∈ (0,θ);
(c) for any T = (T i ) i∈I ∈R N + such that S = {i ∈ I | T i = ∞} is nonempty and 0 S is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, there exists i ∈ S such that ∆V
